一个矩形pwn掉整个内核系列之一 – zone的舞蹈
一个矩形pwn掉整个内核?这听起来很马德里不思议,然而这真实地发生在了今年3月份温哥华的Pwn2Own赛场。这一系列文章会向大家分享我们这次沙箱逃逸用到的Blitzard
CVE-2016-1815的发现和利用经历。我们通过三步走最终完成了这个利用,本文将先问大家介绍第二和第三步 – kalloc.48的舞蹈
和kalloc.8192 重剑无锋
,在最后一篇文章中,我们会回到本源,介绍这个漏洞的起因。
一个矩形pwn掉整个内核?这听起来很马德里不思议,然而这真实地发生在了今年3月份温哥华的Pwn2Own赛场。这一系列文章会向大家分享我们这次沙箱逃逸用到的Blitzard
CVE-2016-1815的发现和利用经历。我们通过三步走最终完成了这个利用,本文将先问大家介绍第二和第三步 – kalloc.48的舞蹈
和kalloc.8192 重剑无锋
,在最后一篇文章中,我们会回到本源,介绍这个漏洞的起因。
In previous blog posts Liang talked about the userspace privilege escalation vulnerability we found in WindowServer. Now in following articles I will talk about the Blitzard
kernel bug we used in this year’s pwn2own to escape the Safari renderer sandbox, existing in the blit
operation of graphics pipeline. From a exploiter’s prospective we took advantage of an vector out-of-bound access which under carefully prepared memory situations will lead to write-anywhere-but-value-restricted to achieve both infoleak and RIP control. In this article we will introduce the exploitation methods we played with mainly in kalloc.48 and kalloc.4096.
First we will first introduce the very function which the overflow occurs, what we can control and how these affect our following exploitation.